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ABSTRACT
This paper develops and tests a signalling model where managers choose
between borrowing at a fixed and an adjustable interest rate. Like other
signalling models, investors are assumed to know the cross-sectional distribution
of firm quality while managers know the quality of their own firms. The decision
to issue adjustable rate debt is shown to provide a negative signal and fixed
rate debt a positive signal about stock value depending upon circumstances
surrounding the level of volatility in Treasury Bill prices and the sensitivity
of firm value to changes in these prices. Regardless of firm value sensitivity
however, high quality firms are not able to separate themselves from low quality
firms until TBill volatility reaches a minimum threshold.
OUr empirical investigation into the stock price response to adjustable and
fixed rate debt announcements is designed to exploit the existence of a threshold
in the data. We attempt to identify the TBill volatility threshold below which
signalling does not occur. Simultaneously, we estimate the average difference
in stock price reaction to the announcement of adjustable and fixed rate debt
conditional upon being above and below the threshold. Our methods would seem to
apply to the investigation of signalling models whenever observable parameters
enter the charaterization of the signalling region.
We examine a matched sample of 47 firms issuing adjustable and fixed rate
rate debt over the period 1978 to 1986, a period containing the greatest activity
in the United States adjustable rate market.
We find that the whole sample
reveals a marginally significant negative difference in stock price reaction at
announcement. On the other hand, the data indicate rather strongly the existence
of a threshold in TBill volatility above which a negative difference in stock
price reaction occurs and below which there is no reaction. We conclude that
part of the data seems to come from a region where the type of debt issued reveal
something material about firm quality and part comes from a region where no
separation of firm quality occurs. Within the former region, the difference in
stock price reaction is about -2.4\ of stock value.
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I • IHTRODUCTIOif

The literature surrounding financing decisionmaking in modern corporations
recognizes two important situations where financing matters.

The first is where

the financing decision affects the future after-tax cash flows generated by the
firm's real investment decisions.

The second is where the financing decision,

although not causing a change in cash flows, serves to reveal or signal the
existence and nature of management information about the firm's real cash flow
prospects.

This

latter situation occurs when the manager has

different

information about the firm's future cash flows than the investing public and the
utility of the manager is influenced by both the financing decision and the
firm's future cash flows.
In a rational market, wherever inter-relationships between financing and
future cash flows are present, one would predict an association between firm
value and financing choice.

However, a contemporaneous stock price reaction to

the announcement of a financing decision is only predicted in situations where
the announcement resolves some uncertainty about the stock's future cash flows.
Decisions based on public information should be anticipated by investors and not
engender a material stock price reaction.

This fact has led many researchers to

emphasize the signalling aspect of financing decisions in the development of
predictions about stock price reactions.•
one interesting aspect of signalling environments is that courses of action
serve as signals only within specific regions of parameter values.

For example,

particular financing decisions can signal high future cash flows only if firms
with low future cash flow find it too costly to mimic high cash flow firms.
otherwise a given decision is an ineffective signal because both high and low
quality firms can make the same decision.

This feature can be exploited

empirically when some of the parameters characterizing the signalling region are
observable to the econometrician.

Under these circumstances, the power of the

test against the null of no stock price reaction can be enhanced by considering
the possibility that pooling is the equilibrium within certain regions of the

1Roaa
(1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977) are early exaaplea. More recent
contributions include Myers and Majluf (1984), Miller and Rock (1985), Grinblatt
and Hwang (1989), and Dravid and Mclficbola (1990).
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data.
These points can be illustrated by considering a generic signalling model.
Suppose the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a signalling
outcome in a particular model are described by the following k inequalities2 :

(1)

,~,

P

,pm

where a 1 ,

••

a 1,

are observable by the econometrician. For every observable parameter

•• ,~

1 , ••

are continuous parameters specific to the model. Suppose

there is a range of values over which a solution for system (1) exists. The n
ranges define the tightest multidimensional rectangle in the a 1 ,

••

,a., space, that

encapsulates the signalling region. Signalling models predict qualitatively
different stock responses to events ocurring inside and outside the rectangle.
The stock response should be, on average, positively related to the intensity of
the

signal

inside the rectangle but unrelated to the signal outside the

rectangle. Moreover,

an empirical investigation should reveal two separate

functions for the stock price response to signal intensity.
This paper uses the above logic to test a signalling model where managers
choose between borrowing at a fixed and an adjustable interest rate. Like other
signalling models, investors are assumed to know the cross-sectional distribution
of firm quality while managers know the quality of their own firms.

The decision

to issue adjustable rate debt is shown to provide a negative signal and fixed
rate debt a positive signal about stock value depending upon circumstances
surrounding the level of volatility in Treasury Bill prices and the sensitivity
of firm value to changes in TBill prices.

Regardless of firm value sensitivity

however, high quality firms are not able to separate themselves from low quality
firms until TBill volatility reaches a minimum threshold.
~xaaples include Proposition 1 in Giaaaarino and Lewis (1988), Proposition
1 in Allen and Faulhaber (1989), and Proposition 1 in Grinblatt and Huang (1989).
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our empirical investigation into the stock price response to adjustable and
fixed rate debt announcements is designed to exploit the existence of a threshold
in the data.

We attempt to identify the TBill volatility threshold below which

signalling does not occur.

Simultaneously, we estimate the average difference

in stock price reaction to the announcement of adjustable and fixed rate debt
conditional upon being above and below the threshold. our methods would seem to
apply to the investigation of signalling models whenever observable parameters
enter the charaterization of the signalling region.
We examine a matched sample of firms issuing adjustable and fixed rate rate
debt and find that the whole sample reveals a marginally significant difference
in stock price reaction at announcement.

On the other hand, the data indicate

rather strongly the existence of a region of TBill volatility within which a
negative difference in stock price reaction occurs. We conclude that part of the
data seems to come from a region where the type of debt issued does not reveal
anything material

about

firm quality and part comes

separation of firm quality occurs.

from a

region where

Within this latter region, the difference in

stock price reaction is about -2.4% of stock value.

II. TilE CHOICE BETWEEJI FIXED AHD ADJUSTABLE-RATE DEBT

II.l. Assumptions and Notation
Consider a two-period economy with stochastic interest rates, where P1
represents the price, at t, of a short-term default-free bond that pays $1 at
t+l. At date t=O, a firm has access to a positive net present value (NPV) project
that requires external financing. The project combined with assets in place
generates a single stochastic cash-flow at date t=2. The present value net of the
value of any pre-existing debt at t<2,

~'

is a function

(2)

where q is a parameter capturing firm quality,

and Y, is a state variable

independent of P,. Firm quality, qEQ={G,B}, can be either Good (G) or Bad (8),
with G>B. Knowledge of q, however, is private to the firm. The market only knows
the probability distribution over firm types, plus the fact that the firm knows
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its own type. The prior probability of the firm being of the Good-type is (). Firm
type becomes public information after the new debt issue, at date t=l.
To fund the project the firm floats discount bonds, subordinate to any
existing debt.

All bonds mature when the project pays-off at t=2. The new bonds

carry either a fixed or an adjustable interest rate: under a fixed interest rate
the firm promises to pay $1 at t=2; under an adjustable rate, the promised
payment is a negative function of the interim short-term, default-free, bond
price, Tr[PtJ, with Tr[EP.J=$1. 3

The function Tr[.) is specified to immunize the

adjustable-rate bonds against shifts in default-free interest rates at t=l. 4 Let
the market value of fixed and adjustable-rate debt at date t, conditional on
message m at issue, be denoted D,"' [m=F,A; t=O,l,2).
In this market the firm moves first by choosing its borrowing strategy: It
sends a message mEM={Fixed,Adjustable}, drawn from a probability distribution
p(mlq). The observation of the borrowing strategy may lead investors to revise
their beliefs about firm quality;

(Jm

denotes the posterior probability of the

firm being of the Good-type conditional on message m.

Whenever possible,

posterior probabilities are formed according to Bayesian updating. Finally,
lenders make their move: they respond to a fixed-rate issue with
an

adjustable-rate

issue with D0A(8A);

we

assume that

Dl (fJF)

an-d to

credit markets

are

competitive so that lenders price bonds to yield a fair return, given their
conjecture of firm quality.

II.2. The Firm's Objective Function
The insider with firm-type q chooses message m={F,A} to maximize

0>0

(3)

where S0"' is the market value of the stock at issue conditional on message m,

~his condition states that the proaiaed payaenta on fixed and adjustablerate bonds are identical if ahort-tera default-free bond prices follow their
expected tiae path between t=O and t=2.
4See Cox, Ingersoll, and Rosa (1980), and Raaaawaay and Sundareaen (1986)
for a discussion of adjustable-rate notes.
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var[s 1• ] is the variance of the stock at t=l, conditional on message m at t•O,
and n is a risk aversion parameter. The insider's objective function is a variant
of Ross ( 1977). Basically, it captures the problem faced by a risk averse manager
who is paid to maximize stock price but whose job is his major source of wealth.
The variance of the equity for firm-type q, at t=l, conditional on message
m (m•F,A) is

For tractability assume that the risk of P 1 and Y1 is small so that a ·series
approximation to the variance of the equity is appropriate. Taking a first-order
Taylor approximation of functions V1 and o,• around the point [EP 1 ,EY 1 ,q] and
computing the variance of the equity, yields

var[ s,•(q)] = (ao,•;aP,) [ (ao,•;aPd -2 (av,;aPd ]Var(Pt) +
+(()D,m/()Yt) [ (i)D 1•j()Yt)-2(()Vtf()Yt) ]Var(Yt)

( 5)

where all derivatives are evaluated at the point [EP 11 EY 1 ,q]. With adjustable-rate
bonds the value of the debt is immunized against shifts in default-free bond
prices, and therefore (()D 1Aj()P 1 )=0; also, because at the approximation point the
promised payment on fixed and adjustable-rate debt are the same, ao,F j()Y 1=()D 1Aj()Y 1 •
As a result, the difference between the equity variance of the two strategies is
simply

(6)

From (6) we can see that it is the sensitivity of firm value with respect to
short-term

~efault-free

bond prices, {)Vtf{)P1 ,

that determines which borrowing

strategy minimizes the variance of the equity. Specifically, low (high) values
of ()VtfoP 1 make adjustable-rate (fixed-rate) borrowing a better hedge. The effect
of bond price volatility, on the other hand, is to magnify the difference between
the equity variance of the two strategies.
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II.3. Equilibrium Borrowing Strategies
In this section we investigate the existence of separating outcomes that
satisfy the Nash Sequential Equilibrium (NSE) criterion of Kreps and Wilson

(1982). To do that we first need to prove the following lemma.

Lemma 1
If [a 2vifaP.aqJ

ii!:

[a2ot taP.aqJ>O then

a{Sl (8F) -QVar ( S1F ( q) ] -S/'(8A) +SlVar ( SIA( q) ) } /aq>O.
Proof in the appendix.

Lemma 1 spells out a sufficient condition that gives the insider of a Goodtype firm a comparative advantage in fixed-rate borrowing. 5 Thus, it opens the
possibility for firms to signal high quality with fixed-rate debt when the
volatility of the equity under fixed-rate borrowing exceeds the volatility under
adjustable-rate borrowing.

Without such a

comparative advantage,

separating

outcomes cannot exist since it always pays for the Bad-type to mimic and issue
fixed-rate bonds. Lemma 1 also excludes the possibility for the firm to signal
high quality with adjustable-rate bonds when fixed-rate borrowing hedges the
value

of

the

equity.

Since

the

Bad-type

has

a

comparative

advantage

in

adjustable-rate, its incentive compatibility is violated whenever the constraint
on the Good-type is satisfied.
Is the sufficient condition of Lemma 1 reasonable? Generally, one would
expect interest rate shifts to produce larger effects on the present value of a
high cash-flow than on the present value of a low cash-flow. Since high quality
implies larger overall project cash-flows, this would imply [a2VIfaP1aq]>O

and

[a2Dt/aP 1aq) ]>0. Furthermore, because cash-flows to creditors are less dependent
on firm quality, one would expect the interest rate sensitivity of firm value to
be more responsive to firm quality than the interest rate sensitivity of a fixedrate bond.

5For those readers faailiar with the signalling literature, L. . . . 1 is
related to Riley's (1979) assuaption 5.
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Proposition I
In the above market, there exists a NSE separating outcome in which Goodtype firms issue fixed-rate debt and Bad-type firms issue adjustable-rate debt;
there isn't, however, a symmetric NSE separating outcome in which the Good-type
issues adjustable and the Bad-type sells fixed-rate debt. Proof in the Appendix.

Proposition I states that firms can signal high quality with fixed-rate
debt when adjustable-rate borrowing makes a better hedge. Since the Good-type
has a comparative advantage in hedging with fixed rate, it finds economical to
take on more equity variance and capture a high stock price at issue. The Badtype, on the other hand, finds the loss in hedging from borrowing at a fixed-rate
too costly.
An important feature of the separating outcome of proposition I is that it
requires

a

minimum level of volatility in default-free bond prices to deter the

Bad-type from mimicking. Intuitively this can be seen from equation (6). When
bond price volatility is low, fixed and ajustable-rate debt are not materially
different, and the two strategies hedge the equity in a similar-fashion.

The

Bad-type is better off by mimicking under these conditions. This intuition is
substantiated in Proposition II.

Proposition II
A necessary condition for the existence of the separating NSE outcome
described in Proposition I is that the variance of short-term, default-free, bond
prices, Var(P1 ) , is not below a threshold (Var(P1 ))*>0. Proof in the appendix.

The empirical analysis below exploits the existence of

a

volatility

threshold. Below the threshold the market cannot infer firm quality from the
choice between fixed and adjustable-rate debt. Thus at low levels of volatility
the model predicts no differential stock price response to the announcement of
fixed and adjustable-rate bond issues. Above the threshold, on the other hand,
there are firms which signal high quality by borrowing at a fixed-rate. Hence,
at high levels of volatility, announcements of fixed-rate bond issues should
elicit a more favorable stock price response than announcements of adjustable-
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rate bond issues. Our empirical approach is to estimate a volatility threshold
in Treasury Bill prices,

and measure the average differential stock price

response to announcements of fixed and adjustable-rate bond issues, above and
below the threshold.

III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODS
III.l. Data
A sample of 47 pairs of debt issue announcements was collected over the
time period spanning 1979 to 1985. The sampling design was motivated by the
relative scarcity of adjustable-rate debt issues. First we attempted to collect
as many observations as possible on adjustable-rate debt issue announcements. We
then looked for suitable fixed-rate matches.
Information on the fixed and adjustable rate debt issues examined in this
study was taken from the Registered Offering Statistics

(ROS) tape of the

Securities and Exchange Commission. The ROS tape contains information on public
corporate debt issues made in the

u.s.

market between 1977 and 1987.

Table 1

shows the aggregate face value of all debt listed on the tape as non-convertible
and unsecured.

This aggregate is broken down by year of issue and also on the

basis of whether the debt offers a fixed or adjustable rate.

The proportion

offering an adjustable rate is only 1\ in 1978 but climbs to a maximum of 13\ in
1983.

The time distribution of our final sample is also reported in the table

and conforms closely_to the total population of adjustable rate debt.

Finally,

the table shows the average annualized TBill yield in each of the years along
with the average TBill price volatility.

We discuss our measure of volatility

in III.2.c.
The ROS tape reports a total of 162 public issues of non-convertible,
unsecured adjustable rate debt sold by companies listed on either the New York
or American Stock Exchange.

For these 162 debt issues, the Wall Street Journal

Index (WSJI) and the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service (DJNRS) were searched for
announcement dates. When news announcing an adjustable rate debt issue appeared
in both sources, the earliest report was selected.

Observations were screened

for confounding announcements of multiple securities and for missing stock
returns. An observation was dropped out of the sample if there were more than 30
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missing daily stock returns over the 140 days preceding the announcement day. The
resulting sample consists of 59 announcements.
In the

second step we attempted to match each adjustable-rate debt

announcement with a suitable fixed-rate debt announcement.

A total of 47 pairs

were obtained by employing the following matching criteria:
(i) Timing: a clean fixed-rate debt issue announcement had to be found
within a 6 month period centered around the adjustable-rate debt issue
announcement date.
(ii) Industry classification: the fixed-rate debt issue announcement had
to be made by a firm in the same industry as the firm announcing the
adjustable rate debt issue.
(iii) Maturity: whenever more than one match for an adjustable rate issue
announcement satisfying ( i) and ( ii) above could be found, the one with the
maturity closest to that of the adjustable-rate issue was selected.

Table 2 reports selected summary statistics on the matched sample. The
average maturity is 10.9 years with average principle of $128.3 "Million.
average asset size of the issuing firms is $24.8 Billion.

The

Within the SIC

classifications represented, the most noteworthy feature is the relatively large
number of depository institutions with SIC code 602.

There are 18 in total.

This reflects the acknowledged importance of banks in the adjustable-rate note
market.

We break out the banking subsample during our discussion of the

empirical results.

III.2. Empirical Model
III.2.A. Preliminaries
our model postulates a relationship between the level of volatility in
Treasury

Bill

prices and the

difference

in stock price

reaction

to the

announcement of adjustable and fixed rate debt.

Above a particular threshold of

volatility,

prospects

some

firms

with good

cash flow

should be able to

distinguish themselves from other firms by offering fixed rate debt.
finding it too costly to mimic issue adjustable rate debt.

Firms

Below the threshold

there is little material difference between a fixed and adjustable rate debt
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issue and firms will be pooled in either fixed or adjustable rate.
Above the threshold, it is not generally possible to formulate an explicit
relationship between TBill volatility and the size of the stock market reaction
other than the prediction that the sign of the reaction is positive on average.
There is no reason to expect, for example, a monotonic relation between TBill
volatility and stock price reaction.

There are two reasons for this.

First, the

characteristics of the population from which the sample data are drawn can easily
change over time and as a function of the volatility of TBill prices.

Moreover,

once the threshold is reached, the percentage of firms that are in a signalling
equilibrium is likely to change as volatility changes.

Second, in models where

there can be more than two types of firms, the average quality difference between
firms issuing fixed rate debt and those issuing adjustable rate debt may either
increase of decrease as the volatility of TBill prices increases. 6
The empirical model has the following form.

Consider the difference in the

stock price reaction to the announcement of adjustable rate debt for firm j and
the stock price reaction to the announcement of fixed rate debt for a suitable
control firm. Call this difference the abnormal return to firm j's·announcement.
The model predicts
E(R.i) =

0

E(R.i) <

0

(7)

where R.i is the abnormal return at announcement for firm j,

~

is the volatility

in TBill prices existing at the time of announcement for firm j, and h* is the
threshold level of TBill volatility below which signalling does not take place.
our primary goal is to detect a negative average abnormal return for firms that
announce
threshold.

adjustable rate debt when TBill volatility

is

above

an unknown

We proceed by positing a switch in means for the abnormal return

process and by attempting to simultaneously estimate the switch point, h*, and
the two means.

The empirical model is represented as

' In general, we would expect the average quality of firaa iaauing fixed
rate debt to increase with interest rate volatility because the coat of
signalling increaaea. Piraa that awitch to adjustable rate debt aerve to raiae
the average quality of adjustable rate iaauera. The average difference in fira
quality depends on the unconditional distribution of fira quality.
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where R;r

< h.

R; -

a.

+

eJ

~

R; =

a2

+

el

hj > h.

~'

(8)

and h• are as defined in equation (7), a 1 and a 2 are the mean

abnormal returns in the two regions of h, and el is a mean zero error term.
model predicts a 1

=0

and a 2 < 0.

The

The null hypothesis that there is no region

within which good firms can signal with fixed rate debt implies that
a 2 and that both are equal to zero. 7

ai

equals

If there are good firms able to signal

throughout the range of TBill volatility in the sample, no threshold should be
detected and both sample means should be negative.
Before describing how the parameters of the abnormal return process are
estimated, we describe the abnormal return and TBill volatility measures.

III.2.B. Abnormal Return Calculation
The stock price reaction to a debt announcement is estimated for every firm
in the sample using standard event study methodology. The stock price reaction
for firm j on day t, AR;11 is defined as

(9)

where R;1 is the return on the common stock of firm j on day t, R. is the return
for the CRSP equally-weighted market index on day t,

and aJ and bJ are the

ordinary least squares coefficients of the market model estimated over the period
(-140,-21] preceding the announcement day. The stock price reaction to the
announcement is defined as the sum of the reactions on the announcement day (day
0) and the day immediately preceding the announcement day (day -1).
The abnormal stock return for each firm j announcing an adjustable rate
debt issue is the difference between the stock price reaction for the firm ard
the stock price reaction for its fixed-rate control firm.

7
Our focus on the difference between the stock -price reaction to firas
announcing adjustable rate debt and those announcing fixed rate debt controls for
the general effects of debt announceaents.
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III.2.C. Estimation of volatility of Treasury Bill prices

Data on short-term Treasury Bills were gathered from the Fama files in the
CRSP tape, which report monthly observations of nominal one and three-month riskfree rates from 1925 to 1987.
The traditional

approach to estimating the volatility of a

financial

variable is to compute, say, sample variance over an interval of observations.
To capture changing volatility, a moving window of observations might be adopted.
More recently, the fitting of an ARCH or GARCH model to financial data has been
suggested as a means of estimating time varying volatility'.

We adopt the latter

approach.
Most adjustable rate debt contracts are written on the three month Treasury
Bill yield or three month LIBOR rate.

We posit the volatility of the three month

Treasury Bill price as the risk measure underlying the adjustable rate debt
decision.'

The TBill price is assumed to follow a random walk10 with time

varying volatility that conforms to a simple GARCH(1,1) process.

Let

(10)

1
See Bolleralev, Chou, Jayaraaan and ltroner (1990) for a review. Specific
exaaples include French, Schwert and Staabaugh (1987) for stock returns and
Engle, Lilian and Robins (1987) for forward interest rate preaia.

'where aanagers are interested in the volatility of longer tara bond prices,
our aeasures of short tara bond price volatility are still of interest. Suppose
the tara structure is deterained by two state variables, the short rate and the
long rate as in Brennan and Schwarta (1982). Then the volatility of interaediate
bonds can be written in teras of the volatility of these two state variables.
Over tiae, the level of volatility in the short tera bond price will do a good
job of ordering the level of uncertainty in bond prices generally if either (1)
aost of the changes in volatility coae through changes in the volatility of the
short rate, or (2) changes in the volatility of long and short rates are highly
correlated over tiae. We would hypothesize that both of these suppositions are
true •

••

~he assWDption of a
randoaw walk in the price series is not an
unreasonable approxiaation.
~here is little autocorrelation in the price
differences and the autocorrelation• are sensitive to the tiae period over which
they are estiaated.
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where

y, is the three month TBill price in month t, h. is the conditional

variance of the change in price from t-1 to t, and u, is the change in price from
t-1 to t. The parametres of the variance process, y0 , y 1 , and y2 , are estimated
with iterative scoring as suggested in Engle (1982).

Results do not appear

sensitive to the choice of starting values.

The time period chosen for the

estimation is the ten year period 1977-1986.

This period includes all of the

adjustable rate debt issues in our sample.
are .063, .22 and .81 11 •

The point estimates of y0 , y 1 and y2

From these estimates and the realizations of u, a

volatility measure in each month is calculated from equation (10).

These

volatilities are used to indicate the uncertainty about future TBill prices
existing at each point in time 12 •
time in Figure 1.

The volatility measures are plotted against

As can be seen volatility is high in the middle of the time

period from the third quarter in 1979 to the second quarter of 1983.

A reference

line has been drawn in the figure to identify the threshold level of volatility
estimated in the next section.

111.2.0. Estimating the volatility threshold and the abnormal return means
The estimation of models having discrete parameter variation has been
studied by Goldfeld and Quandt (1972), Quandt (1958, 1960), and Hinkley (1970) 13 •
our approach follows most closely that of Hinkley ( 1970).

He considers a

discrete time process with independent observations in which a change in means
occurs at an unknown point in the process.
switch point and in the two means.

The researcher is interested in the

For the case where the error terms are

normally distributed, Hinkley (1970) shows that the method of maximum likelihood
involves finding the point in time where dividing the sample and estimating both
means, generates the smallest sum of squared errors.

Although inference about

u The corresponding t-ratios for these estiaates are .57, 1.47 and 5.11
suggesting significant explanatory power for the aodel. The bond prices are
scaled to the price per $1,000 of face value before estiaatiDg volatility.
u
Where the fixed rate anuouuc-ent for the control fira occurs in a
different aonth than the adjustable rate anuouuceaent, the volatility estiaates
are averaged to arrive at the volatility aeasure used for that pair of firas.

° Kon and Jen (1978) and Sanders and Unai (1988) use the fraaework of the
Goldfeld and Quandt switching regression to estiaate switches in regiae for
,respectively, aarket aodel beta and abort tera interest rate volatility.
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the switch point is problematic, inferences about the means are not.

Simulations

reveal that the sample means conform well to their asymptotic distributions based
on the standard deviation of the residuals from the fitted model and the number
of observations in each regime 14 •
In our application,

the switch in regimes is determined by TBill price

-volatility and not a time subscript.

our first step is to rank the observations

on volatility and find the switch that produces the minimum residual variance
from the fitted model with two means 15 •

If the model is correct, the two sample

means are consistent estimates of the true means in the two regimes, with
standard errors approximated by ofvt 1 and o/v(T-t 1 ) , where T and t 1 are the total
number of observations and the number in regime one, and a is the standard
deviation of the residuals approximated by v(SSE/(T-3)) 16 •
Several results are shown in Table 3.

The first panel shows the average

abnormal return for the entire sample and for the banking subsample.

For the

whole sample, the average attains a value of -.0097 with a t-statistic of -1.92.
The banking subsample has an average abnormal return of -.019 with a t-statistic
of -2.24.

This panel provides marginally significant evidence of a negative

overall difference in stock price reaction to adjustable rate debt announcements.
The negative impact is over twice as large for the banking subsample but the
difference in means between the banking subsample and the rest of the sample is
not significant at conventional levels.

The difference is -.0157 with a t-ratio

of -1.56 based on the assumption that the true but unknown standard deviation is
the same for both subsamples.

Cross-sectional measures of variability are used

throughout the analysis.
Panel 2 shows the two means and associated t-ratios when a threshold for
M
See Binkley (1970).
tho•• inveatigated by Goldfeld
where there are aufficient
diatributiona of the proc•••••
under the aaauaption that the

Siaulation evidence in related context• auch aa
and Quandt (1972) and Quandt (1960) indicate• that
obaervationa in each regiae, the aaapling
in each regiae confora well to their diatribution
awitch point i• known.
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We aaauae that the eatiaation error• in the volatility aerie• are
aufficiently aaall that they do not affect the ranking of the volatilitiea, at
leaat in the neighborhood of the •witch in regiaea.

u Conaiatency of the aaaple aeana can be ahown for a liait aa the nuaber
of obaervationa in each regiae increa•••·
Conaiatency of eatiaation of the
awitch point ia not a priaary conaideration for our atudy aince we are not
intereated in drawing inference• about when the awitch takes place.
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volatility is estimated.

The mean of the first regime is .002 and insignificant,

while the mean of the second regime is -.024 with a t-ratio of -3.44.

The

likelihood ratio

The

for

the model suggests a

significant overall

fit 17 •

volatility threshold is at 2.1, which splits the sample into 26 announcements
below the threshold and 21 announcements above the threshold.

The estimated

threshold is shown graphically in Figure 1 as two horizontal line. segments.
Although there is no necessity within the estimation procedure, the threshold
cuts both the volatility and the sample points roughly in half.
Results for the banking subsample are broken out separately in Panel 2 as
well.

The means and t-ratios are based on the same threshold estimate from the

whole sample.

The mean from the low volatility period is -.009 and insignificant

while the mean from the high volatility period is -.030 with a t-ratio of
-2.43.

There are 9 banks in each volatility regime.

The estimate of the threshold volatility relies heavily on the observations
directly surrounding the switch point.
have very little influence.

Observations far from the switch point

As a result, the likelihood function does not

necessarily fall away smoothly from the maximum.

Figure 2 shows'a plot of the

sum of squared errors as a function of the switch point.

Note that the figure

reveals several switch points with relatively low sums of squared errors.

To

check for sensitivity of our results to changes in the switch point, we examined
the means implied by each of the five best switch points.

For none of the five

is the mean of the first regime significantly different from zero at the 5%
level.

For each of five, the mean of the second regime generates a t-ratio more

negative than -2.

III.2.E. An additional test
As discussed in the motivation for our empirical tests,

the model of

adjustable rate debt choice does not necessarily imply a negative slope in a

17 Since the switch aodel is nonlinear, statistical inference can often
be
sharpened by aiaulating an eapirical distribution of traditional teat statistics
under the null hypothesis. We applied our search algoritha to 500 aaaplea of
randoaly generated noraal errors.
These error• were paired with the aaae
volatility aeaaurea used in the study and the algoritha searched for a switch
point and two aeana.
There were seven cases of a t-ratio exceeding 3 • 4 in
absolute value. There were 51 cases of Chi-squared statistics exceed 7.6.
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regression of abnormal return on TBill price volatility.

Nevertheless, a simple

linear regression of abnormal return on volatility is presented in the last panel
of Table 3.

For the whole sample, the slope is negative and significant with a

t-ratio of -2.40.

It is natural to expect a negative slope even though it is

not, strictly speaking, an implication of the theory.

The significance of the

regression is insensitive to transformations of the volatility from variance to
standard deviation, but a regression based on the rank
a somewhat less significant slope.
(not reported in the table).

~f

the volatilities has

In this case the t-ratio increases to -1.95

The banking subsample does not have a significant

slope coefficient although the magnitude of the slope is the same as for the
overall sample.

The t-ratio is -1.47.

Viewed in total, it does not appear that

the banking subsample is materially different from the overall sample even though
they have participated more heavily in the adjustable rate debt market.

III.3.Summary and Conclusions
This paper proposes to test a signalling hypothesis about the decision to
borrow at an adjustable interest rate by exploiting the possibility that all of
the data do not fall within the signalling region.

We argue that the fixed

versus adjustable rate decision cannot convey information about the firm until
the volatility in Treasury Bill prices exceeds a threshold. The data indicate
that the announcement of an adjustable rate debt issue is viewed as a negative
signal when the economy is above a threshold that is simultaneously estimated
from the data.

The matched sample methodology controls for the impact on firm

value of more traditional fixed rate debt announcements.

The recognition that

a threshold of volatility might exist in the data has improved the power to
detect a difference in the announcement effects of fixed and adjustable rate
debt, although the results appear marginally significant even if a threshold is
not estimated.
Finally, a word on future applications.

An additional opportunity to test

the specific model of adjustable rate debt choice is available in the Eurobond
market where data on .!ldjustable rate securities are in greater abundance.

It is

possible that the higher interest rate volatilities of many foreign markets will
provide a larger sample of firms operating within the signalling region.

One
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interesting question is whether these regions differ across countries as a
function of how well firms are able to index their operating cash flow to changes
in interest rates.
In addition, exploiting the concept of a threshold would seem to apply to
signalling models generally whenever the signalling region imposes restrictions
on observable parameters.

For example, in Miller and Rock (1985), signalling

high cash-flows with cash payouts limits the amount of funds available for
profitable investment. If the firm has few and poor investment opportunities,
payouts cannot convey information.

The challenge in this case is to find a good

proxy for the firm's investment opportunity set.

In other models, a

~aximum

level of financial slack is required for the signalling outcome to exist. For
example, in John and Williams (1985) firms can signal only when the investment
outlay plus the amount of "liquidity" demanded by shareholders exceeds the
internal supply of cash. In other models, low quality firms choose not to mimick
to avoid incurring higher transaction costs from issuing securities in the
capital market (Bhattacharya (1979), Flannery(1986)). In these models, pooling
occurs whenever transaction costs are below a threshold.

Given the fixed nature

of these costs, firm size could maybe be used to estimate a threshold.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1:
Since

sl (6F)

and

s 0A(6A)

are independent of q, we only need to show that

a{Var(S 1F(q) ]-Var(S 1A(q)) }/aq=
a{Var(D 1F(q) )-2Cov(V.(q) ,D 1F(q) )-Var(D 1A(q) ]+2Cov(V.(q) ,D 1A(q)] }/aq > 0

Since

the

equity

risk

at

t=l

is

local,

we

can

evaluate

Var[D 1m(q)]

(Al)

and

Cov[V1 (q) ,D 1m(q)] based on a series expansion of D(m(P 11 Y1 ,q) and V.(P 11 Y1 ,q) around
point (EP 1 ,EY 1 ,q]. Based on such expansion, we obtain

Var[D 1m(P 11 Y1 ,q) ]= [aD 1m/aP.J 2Var (P.) +[aD 1m/aY.J 2Var(Y.) +
+[a2o 1mjaP 1 2]2Var[P 1-EP.J 2+[a2o 1m/aY 1 2]2Var[Y 1-EY.J 2+
+[azo 1m/aY 1aP.J 2Var[P 1-EP.J [Y 1-EY.J+ •••••

(A2)

Cov [V.(P 1 , Y1 , q), D1m(P 1 , Y1 , q)] = [ ao 1m/aP.J [ av.jaP.JVar ( P.) +
+[aD 1mjaY.J [aV1 /aY.JVar(Y.)+[a2o 1m/aP 1 2] [a2V 1/aP 1 2]Var[P 1-EP.J 2+
+[a2o 1m/aY 1 2J [a2V 1/aY 1 ZJVar[Y 1-EY.J 2+ •••••

(A3)

where all derivatives are evaluated at the point [EP 1 ,EY 1 ,q], and the covariance
(A3) reflects the fact that P 1 and Y1 are independent random variables. Under an
adjustable interest rate, the value of the bonds is insensitive to P 1 and thus
all first and higher-order partial derivatives of D1A involving P 1 are zero.
Furthermore, since at the approximation point the promised payments on fixed and
adjustable-rate bonds are the same, all partial derivatives involving exclusively
Y1 are identical for the

~~~

bond types. Hence, we can write

Var[Dt(q) ]-2Cov[ IJ 1 (q) ,Dt(q) ]-Var[D 1A(q) ]+2Cov[V.(q) ,D 1A(q))

=

= [aD 1F/aP.J 2Var(P.) -2 (aDt jaP.J [aV.jaP.JVar (P 1 )+
+[azot jaP 1 2] 2Var( P 1-EP.J 2-2 [a2D 1F/aP 1 2] [a2V 1/aP 1 2 ]Var(P 1-EP.J 2+
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(A4)

Take the derivative of (A4) with respect to firm type, q. Since Var(P 1-EP 1 ]2 and
Var(P 1-EP.J [Y 1-EY.J are one order of magnitude smaller than Var(P.), the sign of
the derivative is the same as the sign of

(AS)

But with

[o2VtfoP 1 oq)~[o2Dt /oP 1oq)

)>0,

(AS) is positive. Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition I:
To prove existence a NSE separating outcome in which Good-type firms issue fixedrate debt and Bad-type firms issue adjustable-rate debt, we show that there is
a region of the parameter space that satisfies the two incentive compatibility
constraints:

Sl(lJF=1)-nVar(S 1F(q=G)) - S0A(tJA=O)+nVar(S 1 A(q=G))

~

0

(A6)

Sl(8F=1)-nVar(S 1F(q=B)) - S0A(tJA=O)+nVar[S 1 A(q=B)) S 0

(A7)

Consider parameter values that make Var(S 1F(q) )>Var(S 1A(q) ]. Then there exists a
risk-aversion parameter, n>O, and a firm type, BSq*SG, such that

(AS)

But from Lemma 1 (AS) is increasing in q. Thus the two incentive compatibility
constraints are satisfied.
To show that there isn't a NSE separating outcome in which the Good-type
issues adjustable and the Bad-type sells fixed-rate debt, suppose the incentive
compatibility constraint for the Bad-type is satisfied, i.e., assume

(A9)
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But if (A9) holds Lemma 1 implies that the incentive compatibility constraint for
the Good-type is violated. Thus, the two incentive compatibility constraints on
this separating outcome cannot be simultaneously satisfied. Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition II:
The incentive compatibility constraint on the Bad-type in the separating outcome
described in Proposition I is

(AlO)

Since the right-hand side of (AlO) is positive, the left-hand side also has to
be positive if (AlO) is to hold. Rewrite (AlO) as

Var[Dt(q=B) )-2Cov[VJ(q=B) ,D 1F(q=B) )-Var[D/(q=B) )+2Cov[VJ(q) ,D 1A(q=B))
ie

[S/(8p=l)-S0A(8A=0) )/n

(All)

But from (A4)

Var[Dt (q=B)) -2Cov(V.(q=B) ,D 1F(q=B) )-Var(D 1A(q=B) )+2Cov[V 1 (q) ,D 1A(q=B)) =

= {[oD 1F/oP 1 ]2-2 (oDt /oP.J (oV.foP.J }Var (P.) +A[Var (P.))

(A12)

where the derivatives are evaluated at [EP 1,EY 1 ,q), and A is a small (in absolute
value) remainder term whose absolute size is increasing in Var(P 1 ) ;

(A12) is

positive when Var(P 1 )>0 and zero otherwise. Since the remainder term is small (in
absolute value) vis-a-vis the first term, it follows that

(Al3)

and there

is a

positive threshold volatility,

(Var(P.) )*,

that makes the

incentive compatibility constraint to hold tightly. Finally, because (Al2) is
monotonically

increasing in P.,

the

incentive compatibility constraint

violated whenever Var(P 1 )<[Var(P 1 ))*. Q.E.D.

is
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Table 1
Corporate Debt and Treasury Bill Information
over the Period 1978-1986

Year

Fixed
Rate

Adjustable Proportion of
Rate
adjustable

1978 19,466
1979 23,093
1980 63,230
1981 39,017
1982 90,425
1983 61,556
1984 105,344
1985 142,483
1986 236,167

200
803
669
676
7,889
9,158
12,440
7,635
9,233

1.0\
3.4\
1.0\
1.7\
8.0\
13.0\
10.6\
5.1\
3.8\

Sum 780,781
Avg.

48,703

5.9\

Av. Yield on
3-month TBill
7.54\
10.32\
11.85\
14.12\
10.68\
8.84\
9.70\
7.62\
6.04\

Av. Volatility # pairs
3-month TBill in sample
0.9797
2.0225
19.5625
13.0694
12.6158
4.3993
1. 6103
1. 9544
1.0589

1
4
1
3
6
10
10
10
2
47

9.63\

6.36

Notes: Amounts of fixed and adjustable rate debt are in $ Million of principal
as reported in the Registered Offering Statistics of the SEC. TBill information
taken from CRSP.
Volatility based on GARCH(1,1) applied to TBill issue price
changes with units equal to dollars per thousand of principal. Number of pairs
in sample is the final sample used in empirical tests.
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Table 2
SIC breakdown of debt issues and selected summary
statistics for the adjustable and matched fixed rate bond sample

Floating rate debt
# of observations:

47

Average maturity(years):

10.9

Average principal(mi11ions):

128.3

Average asset size
of the issuing firm(millions): 24830

SIC classification:
Extractive
1
Manufacturing
17
Transportation
0
Communication
1
Electric, Gas & Water
2
Banks, Bank Holding co, and
Thrifts(depository institut.) 18
Financial excluding Banks,
Bank Holding Co, and Thrifts
3
Commercial and Other
5

Fixed rate debt
# of observations:

47

Average maturity(years):

13.1

Average principal(millions):

111.1

Average asset size
of the issuing firm(millions): 16046

SIC classification:
Extractive
1
Manufacturing
17
Transportation
0
Communication
1
Electric, Gas & Water
2
Banks, Bank Holding co, and
Thrifts(depository institut.) 18
Financial excluding Banks,
Bank Holding Co, and Thrifts
3
Commercial and Other
5
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Table 3
Estimates of the announcement effect of adjustable rate debt
Matched sample results based on 47 pairs of announcements
over the period 1979-1986
Parameter Estimates
Panel 1:

Mean abnormal return
mean

t-ratio

-.0095

-1.92

Banks

-.0192

-2.24

Banks - Others

-.0157

-1.56

All Firms

Panel 2:

.0543

Switch in regimes based on equation (3) in the text
t-ratio

All Firms
Banks
Panel 3:

Banks

t-ratio

• 002

0.35

-.024

-3.44

-.009

-.74

-.030

-2.43

Chi-square test
7.68

Linear regression of abnormal return on volatility
Model fit over time period
int

All Firms

Sum of Squared Errors

t-ratio

slope

t-ratio

.0021

.35

-.0027

-2.40

-.0067

-.56

-.0028

-1.47

Chi-square test
5.66

Notes: Banks are the subsample of 18 pairs with SIC code 602. Panel 1 contains
simple means for entire time period. Banks - Others is the difference in mean
for the two subsamples. T-ratio is based on a common estimate of variance and
a difference in means test applied. Panel 2 contains estimated means from two
regimes. MLE of switch point is at volatility of 2.1, which puts 26 firms in
first regime and 21 in second regime. Banks have 9 firms in each regime. Linear
regression is for comparison purposes. Chi-square test is -2logX where X is the
likelihood ratio (the ratio of the sum of squared errors from panel 1 divided by
the sum of squared errors from the model in the respective panel, all raised to
the power of 47/2. Each statistic can be construed to have one degree of freedom
although the conformity with the Chi-squared distribution with one degree of
freedom is approximate for the nonlinear model in panel 2. The statistic in
panel 3 would conform asymptotically to a Xl(l) under the null hypothesis. The
statistic in panel 3 is reported for comparison. For the linear regression,
exact tests based on the t-ratio of the slope or, equivalently, an F-test provide
more precise inferences. Test reported for complete sample only.
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